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The topic I explore here is especially elusive and tangential. It concerns the role of 
the anticipated, the barely sensed, the possible, and the conditional in the structuring 
of ordinary peoples' perceptions and actions in extraordinary times of acute duress, 
crisis, and chronic violence.1 1 aim to trace in the workings of the conflict in Ambon, 
with occasional forays into neighboring Moluccan Islands, the influence and effects of 
what is most often glossed by terms denoting a certain presence but bereft of any real 
precision such as "climate," "ambiance," "atmospherics," and "milieu." Elusive as 
this may sound, I hope to show that what I pursue here is not only crucial to making 
sense of Ambon and the war's unfolding over the past few years, but that it also
1 This paper is a slightly modified version of the inaugural lecture I presented at Leiden University on 
November 29,2002 as the new Chair of the Anthropology and Sociology of Modern Indonesia. The 
research on which it is based is ongoing within the context of the "Indonesia in Transition" Program 
funded by the Dutch Academy of Sciences. I would like to thank the Dutch Academy of Sciences for its 
support of this four-year research program, as well as the members of the "Indonesian Mediations" 
subproject within this larger program for their continual stimulation. Rafael Sanchez provided inspiring 
commentary and suggestions for which I thank him gratefully. I extend my profound thanks to Jim Siegel for 
encouraging me to submit this written version of the lecture to Indonesia and for ensuring its speedy 
publication. I am also indebted to the many Moluccan refugees who told me their stories, and to the media 
practitioners, NGO activists, members of religious and humanitarian organizations, and the many other 
ordinary Indonesians on whose comments and contributions this paper draws.
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speaks to such anthropological staples as agency, the production of identity, meaning­
making, and representation—though not in relation to the "normal" conditions with 
respect to which these are primarily construed, but as refigured in the most extreme, 
even exceptional, of circumstances.
Since the outbreak of communal violence in Ambon city—the capital of the island 
of the same name in the province of Maluku—in mid-January 1999 up through the 
Malino II Peace Agreement of last February, much has been written about this conflict 
which over time consolidated two polarized religiosities—one Christian and one 
Muslim—as the war's main obvious opponents. These writers include anthropologists 
and other social scientists, both within and outside of Indonesia, activists and 
representatives of a range of local, national, and international NGOs, a number of 
protagonists within the conflict, as well as media practitioners based in Ambon and 
the surrounding islands, the capital Jakarta, or beyond the country's borders especially 
in Australia, the Netherlands, and the USA.2
In reports ranging from highly engaged and informed analyses to the more codified 
versions of NGO-speak, and the "contaminated" slanted stories that bolster the truth 
claims of one or another side, the origins, complicating factors and backgrounds, major 
events, and relevant national and international developments have been scrutinized 
and amply discussed in terms of their respective contributions to Ambon's violence.
2 A selection of the many publications includes, among the more academic, George Junus Aditjondro, "Guns, 
Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to 
preserve their political and economic privileges," in Violence in Indonesia, ed. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia 
Wimhofer (Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 2001), pp. 100-128; Dieter Bartels, "Your God is No Longer Mine," 
apakabar@saltmine.radix.net, September 9,2000; Nils Bubandt, "Malukan Apocalypse: Themes in the 
dynamics of violence in eastern Indonesia," in Violence in Indonesia, pp. 228-253; Andries Greiner, ed., De 
Molukken in Crisis: Machteloos, ver weg, maar niet wanhopig, Actuele Onderwerpen 2691, February 18, 
2000; Gerry van Klinken, "The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In," Indonesia 71 (April 2001): 1-26; 
Wim Manuhutu et al., Maluku Manis, Maluku Menangis: De Molukken in Crisis. Een poging tot verklaring 
van de geweldsexplosie op de Molukken (Utrecht: Moluks Historisch Museum/Moluccan Information and 
Documentation Center, 2000); Fridus Steijlen, "Kerusuhan Het misverstand over de Molukse onrust," 
pamphlet, Forum: Utrecht 2000; Tim Pengkajian Universitas Pattimura, "Analisis Sosial tentang Peristiwa 
Kerusuhan Berdarah di Kotamadya Ambon dan Sekitarnya Januari-Februari 1999," pamphlet (Ambon: np,
1999) . NGO and activist works include "Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku," 
International Crisis Group Report No. 10, Jakarta/Brussels, December 19, 2000; "Indonesia: The Search 
for Peace in Maluku," International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report No. 31, Jakarta/Brussels, February 
2002; "Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon," Human Rights Watch Report, March 1999; Zairin Salempessy 
and Thamrin Husain, eds. Ketika Semerbak Cengkih Tergusur Asap Mesiu: Tragedi Kemanusiaan Maluku di 
Balik Konspirasi Militer, Kapitalis Birokrat, dan Kepentingan Elit Politik (Jakarta: Sekretariat Tapak 
Ambon, 2001); S. Sinansari ecip, Menyulut Ambon: Kronologi Merambatnya Berbagai Kerusuhan Lintas 
Wilayah di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1999); Luka Maluku: Militer Terlibat (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus 
Informasi [ISAI], 2000); Tim Penyusun al-Mukmin, Tragedi Ambon (Jakarta: Yayasan Al-Mukmin, 1999). 
Other sources (including some by protagonists in the conflict) are Erwin H. Al-Jakartaty, Tragedi Bumi 
Seribu Pulau: Mengkritisi Kebijakan Pemerintah dan Solusi penyelesaian Konflik (Jakarta: BukKMaNs,
2000) ; M Husni Puruhena, SH, Buku Putih-Tragedi Kemanusiaan dalam Kerusuhan di Maluku. Sebuah 
Prosesi Ulang Sejarah Masa Lalu (Ambon: np, 1999); Rustam Kastor, Konspirasi Politik RMS dan Kristen 
Menghancurkan Ummat Islam di Ambon-Maluku (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2000); Rustam Kastor, Suara 
Maluku Membantah/Rustam Kastor Menjawab (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2000); Mediator Dalam 
Kerusuhan Maluku (Jakarta: Sekretariat Komisi Kateketik KWI, 2001); Tragedi Kemanusiaan Maluku 
dipersembahkan kepada dunia internasional atas nama rakyat Maluku yang menderita oleh Front Kedaulatan 
Maluku (Ambon: np, 2000); Jan Nanere, ed., Halmahera Berdarah (Ambon: Bimspela, 2000).
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Acting as so many theatrical backdrops against which the main action unfolds, 
important externalities and internal factors have been named as enabling and 
providing fertile ground for the outbreak of violence; these include such macro political 
and economic structures as the Southeast Asian financial crisis of 1997 and its 
aftermath, the stepdown of Suharto and the transitions of Reformasi, and the behind- 
the-scene connivings of Jakarta's political elite and the military. Tensions among 
Ambonese Christians and Muslims, more specifically, are seen as having been 
aggravated over the long term, as well as more recently, by the religious division of 
labor established under Dutch colonial rule which privileged Christians and 
marginalized Muslims socially, economically, and educationally; the parallel processes 
of Islamicization and Christianization in the wake of World War II and the related 
erosion of the common ground of "custom" or adat shared by Ambonese;3 and the 
"greening" or Islamicization of Indonesia generally under the late Suharto regime as 
evidenced in Ambon by the appointment of two Ambonese Muslims as provincial 
governors, a development that left Christians feeling they were now the ones being left 
behind.4 Add to this increasing land shortage, population pressure, and the in- 
migration of Muslims from South Sulawesi,5 which skewed the more or less equal 
numerical balance on the island between Christians and Muslims, and the involvement 
of some Ambonese (especially urban youth) in gangs and criminality6—and one has a 
situation waiting to happen. Waiting to happen perhaps, but still not yet, not quite, 
happening.
I have learned from and generally subscribe to many of these arguments and 
analyses that I have summarily reviewed here. But I have also been troubled by the
3 For a good history of Ambonese society from the Dutch colonial rule of the late-nineteenth century through 
the nationalist movement, independence, and the Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) movement of the 
1950s, see Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990). Juliet 
Patricia Lee provides a more recent assessment of Ambonese society, its transformations under the Suharto 
regime, and Muslim-Christian relations in her doctoral dissertation "Out of Order: The Politics of 
Modernity in Indonesia" (PhD dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Virginia, 1999).
On the widely publicized pela or blood-brother relations which conjoin some Muslim and Christian 
villages and kin groups, see Dieter Bartels, "Guarding the Sacred Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, 
Religious Syncretism and Ethnic Identity among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas" (PhD 
dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Cornell University, 1977), and his "Your God is No Longer 
Mine." Richard Chauvel offers an excellent critical evaluation of the deployment of pela for political 
purposes, in addition to information on Ambon's Muslims in his "Ambon's Other Half: Some Preliminary 
Observations on Ambonese Moslem Society and History," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 14,1 
(1980): 40-80.
4 On the Islamicization of Indonesia under the late New Order, see Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims 
and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), and "Islamization and 
Democratization in Indonesia," in Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in 
Muslim Southeast Asia, ed. Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvawitch (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press 1997), pp. 75-127.
5 At issue here is recent migration dating from the 1970s. More generally, Ambon has attracted migrants 
already for several centuries—including peoples from South Sulawesi. See Gerrit J. Knaap, "A City of 
Migrants," Indonesia 51 (April 1991): 105-132.
6 For an insightful discussion and history of the category of "youth," see Jean and John Comaroff, 
"Reflections on Youth, From the Past to the Postcolony," in Youth in Africa: Producing Futures in a Global 
Age, ed. Ron Kassimir, Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (New York: under the aegis of the Social Science 
Research Council, forthcoming).
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sense that something is missing. Some of this writing is just too grand, too abstract, 
and too removed from the volatile fractured field where Ambonese men, women, and 
children piece together their everyday lives out of the fears, contingencies, insecurities, 
and apprehensions that now weigh upon them. What tends to be passed over in 
foregrounding the influence of Indonesia's major political players—the networks of 
militant Muslims, the nefarious wheelings and dealings of thugs, the inbred violence, 
corruption, and partisan affections of the police and the military, and the shadowy 
plots of provocateurs and puppeteers—is the character of the very space in which all 
of these figures, for better or for worse, deploy their schemes and make their dubious 
marks.
Too little heed is given to the work of the imagination and the construction of 
knowledge in all of this and, specifically, to how these compel and propel particular 
actions and shape those who carry them out. The mobile, dense, and murky terrain in 
which something that is waiting to happen does, in fact, happen is built on spirals of 
information, misinformation, and disinformation, on the revamping of criteria of 
credibility, customs of trust and accountability, and on knowledge forms that blur the 
boundaries between what is seen and what is heard, what is known and what is 
suspected, what is feared and what is fantasized, what is fact and what is fiction.7 
This, I believe, is what is meant by "climate." No mere backdrop, climate's 
infrastructure in Ambon comprises the overt and covert representations and 
mobilizations of both mass and more small-scale, politically driven "tactical" media, 
the circulation and sedimentation of ideologically potent images and hard-edged 
reified positions, as well as rumors, graffiti, unknowables, and even unnamables. These 
haunt the terrain in which big men, regular folk, and shadowy characters move, and 
these structure—equally but differently—their varied perceptions and actions. More 
blatantly than in other settings, agency in such circumstances also means being acted 
upon—suffering bodily exposure, terror, and enforced passivity. Before I turn to some 
examples, an outline of the conflict is in order.
On January 19, 1999, a run-of-the-mill fight between a Christian bus driver and a 
Muslim passenger escalated into a full-scale battle between Christian "red" forces and 
Muslim "white" forces fought out in the streets of Ambon with traditional or 
homemade weapons—knives, spears, machetes, arrows shot from slingshots, fishing 
bombs, and Molotov cocktails. By the end of the day, numerous houses, stores, offices, 
churches, and mosques had been destroyed or burned, scores of people had been 
displaced, and others wounded or killed. On the eve of the Malino II Peace Agreement, 
some three years later, the International Crisis Group estimates a minimum of five 
thousand and possibly as many as ten thousand people were killed and close to 
700,000 refugees, equaling one-third of a total Moluccan population of 2.1 million,
7 See Ann Laura Stoler's excellent "'In Cold Blood': Hierarchies of Credibility and the Politics of Colonial 
Narratives," Representations (Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories) 37 (1992): 151- 
189. Her reading of the colonial sources that were part of "the gossamered climates of violence" within 
which stories of a planter's murder were told proved useful to me in thinking about Ambon's violence.
Some of the differences between evaluating such murky events through written, colonial documentation and, 
by contrast, through my own approach (based, among other things, on conversations and interviews with 
refugees and media practitioners) are instructive. Arjun Appadurai's helpful "Life After Primordialism" 
also addresses some of the issues discussed here. See Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural 
Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 139-157.
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comprising also those fleeing violence on neighboring islands.8 In the largely 
residentially segregated city of Ambon, the kind of sectarian border skirmish that set 
all this off was common. Under normal circumstances it would also have remained a 
non-event—except, of course, for those immediately involved.
In what scholars increasingly identify as this first phase of the war, which lasted 
from mid-January 1999 until May 2000, periods of violent confrontation between 
native Ambonese Christian and Muslim mobs and mass destruction alternated with 
lulls, during which attempts at reconciliation involving elite Ambonese from both sides 
were occasionally made.9 Jakarta's blunders also begin early on, as the first troops sent 
to quell the violence were dispatched from South Sulawesi—that part of Indonesia 
from which the Muslim migrants driven out of Ambon during the conflict's first weeks 
also hail—with shoot-on-sight orders, and with a general lack of initiative and 
direction. This first phase is also marked by the outbreak of violence in the Kei Islands 
in Southeast Maluku in April 1999 and in the soon-to-be declared new province of 
North Maluku in August of the same year.
Phase two marked a qualitative change in the civil war, with the arrival to Ambon 
in May 2000 of the so-called Laskar Jihad.10 Called into existence out of a rising 
concern among Muslims that the Christians had the upper hand in the conflict, this 
militant Muslim organization, with recruits from Java, Sumatra, and South Sulawesi, 
provides both partisan humanitarian assistance and armed support. The Laskar Jihad 
emerged in the wake of a massacre of four hundred Muslims in a mosque in North 
Maluku in late December 1999 and was further authorized by a more general call for 
jihad during a mass rally in Jakarta held in early January 2000 under the auspices of 
such major Indonesian political figures as the country's current vice-president, Hamzah 
Haz, and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat) Speaker, Amien Rais.
The amount and sophistication of weapons used in the war had grown over time, 
but the Laskar Jihad brought a surplus of professional arms to Ambon. It also 
introduced some order into the local Muslim militias who initially, at least, welcomed 
these supporters, and it enjoyed the clear backing of segments of the armed forces. The 
Christians found themselves significantly outnumbered and outgunned, with the 
numbers of casualties and amount of devastation increasing proportionately. By late 
June 2000 a state of civil emergency was declared in both Maluku and North Maluku 
provinces, and a special conjoined force of elite troops was dispatched to Ambon. If 
the declaration of the state of emergency greatly curtailed civil liberties—not the least 
of the press—and further enhanced the militarization of everyday life, it also gradually 
limited the number of large-scale confrontations.
8 ICG Asia Report No. 31, "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku," Jakarta/Brussels, February 8, 
2002 .
9 See Bartels, "Your God in No Longer Mine," and Aditjondro's "Guns, Pamphlets, and Handie-Talkies."
10 Kirsten E. Schulze provides one of the most informative dicussions of the Laskar Jihad's background as 
an organization and of its activities. See Kirsten E. Schulze, "Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon" in 
The Brown journal of World Affairs IX,1: 57-69, 2002. For a more general discussion see "Indonesia: 
Violence and Radical Muslims, " Indonesia Briefing, International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels, 
October 10, 2001.
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This second phase of the conflict was further characterized by a deepening of the 
religious definition of the opposing parties and the crystallization of relevant extremist 
discourses—to wit, that of militant Islam and jihad, represented by the Laskar Jihad 
and the smaller, more covert Laskar Mujaheddin, on the one hand, and that of 
nostalgic sovereignty and separatism, on the other, promulgated by the Christian FKM 
(Front Kedaulatan Maluku, Front for Moluccan Sovereignty). Posing as die successor to 
die former RMS (Republic of the South Moluccas) movement, which in actuality only 
exists as a shadow of its former self among segments of the Moluccan population in 
the Netherlands, the FKM aims to bring about the nostalgic resurrection of an 
indigenous, "Alifuru" Moluccan identity, and boasts a leader who models himself after 
Xanana Gusmao, current charismatic leader of former East Timor, which recently 
achieved national sovereignty and so figures as a model.
With the decrease by 2001 of large-scale confrontations and their replacement by 
sporadic bombings and sniper attacks, the partial restraint of the Laskar Jihad under 
civil emergency conditions, and the signing of the Malino II Peace Agreement in early 
2002, a third, still-ongoing phase of the conflict can be tentatively discerned. A 
declared state of civil emergency remains in effect, as does the concomitant 
militarization of daily life and the banning of foreigners from Maluku. The sense of 
euphoria in Ambon's streets following last February's Malino agreement has been 
marred by the intermittent explosions and attacks which many suspect are 
orchestrated by those who profit from the perpetuation of chronic, low-scale violence: 
segments of the military and police, individual deserters from the same, local 
gangsters, militant groups, and possibly more shadowy protagonists.11 The city 
remains divided into rigorously defended, religiously marked territories or, as one 
source acutely observes, "concentrated pools of resentment and bitterness," in other 
words, potential breeding grounds for more violence alongside—it must be said— 
emerging neutral zones and places of resistance and peace.12 This, in broad strokes, is 
the war. Much has obviously been left out of this summary, not the least the kinds of 
atmospherics to which I alluded earlier.
Let me begin at the beginning—itself a point of bitter contention between Christians 
and Muslims, since each side accuses the other of largely preparing and master­
minding die onset of violence. As others have also pointed out, Ambon is not an island 
unto itself, which means that Christians and Muslims living there are cognizant of 
violence elsewhere, especially when it is religiously inflected. As on Lombok, an island 
some one thousand miles west of Ambon, where following an outbreak of anti- 
Christian riots in early 2000 graffiti on a house read "this is in response to what was 
done to Muslims in Ambon,"13 so too, on Ambon, events in other places may seize 
hold of the imaginations of Ambonese. Most accounts of the war name a fight between 
Ambonese gangsters at a gambling den in Ketapang, Jakarta in November 1998, the 
ensuing anti-Christian violence and church-burnings following the deaths of four 
Muslims, and the arrival of more than one hundred uprooted underworld preman to 
Ambon as events that precipitated trouble in January.
11 On the problem of Ambon's "rebel soldiers" or deserters, see "Perang Tentara Pembangkang di Ambon," 
Tempo, edisi 10, June 16, 2002, pp. 24-37.
12 ICG Asia Report no. 31, p. 17.
13 Leena Avonius, unpublished PhD dissertation, in progress.
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What is usually not mentioned is a meeting convened by the governor in the 
intervening month of December.14 Meant as precautionary, the meeting instilled a sense 
of the possible in an already nervous city, working as an augury of what might happen 
before it actually occurred. The governor impressed upon Ambon's Muslim and 
Christian communities the need to be prepared, to be on the alert, on the look-out, and 
to guard against rumors. Both sides went home and set up posko, either communication 
or command posts—a slippage which suggests how easily the one slides into the 
other—with networks of mosques and chinches connected by both cellular and regular 
phones.
In this case, being prepared for the worst can in crucial respects be said to have 
produced the worst. When on January 19 the fight broke out in the marketplace, each 
side quickly mobilized its members, staging in no time at all a battle between "reds" 
and "whites." Ironically to this day, it is precisely this preparedness and visible 
organization that each side holds out to the other as proof of their opponent's 
preconceived plan to mount an attack. It is also this which many scholars seize upon 
as evidence of large-scale, coordinated, behind-the-scene machinations.
My second example of how anticipation augurs what actually comes to pass also 
derives from that same first, fateful day, one which happened to coincide with Idul 
Fitri, the festive close of the Muslim fasting month, Ramadhan. In retrospect some may 
see January 19, 1999 as falling into the category of "likely violence days," a 
formulation coined by a US Embassy security officer in Israel in recognition of the 
patterned repetition of violent outbreaks on Palestinian commemorative occasions.15 
Whether conjoining identity and trauma or, as with Idul Fitri, religious celebration and 
community, such days are charged with a practiced, ritualized sense of collectivity. Yet 
in many parts of Indonesia, and certainly in Ambon, the celebration of Idul Fitri is also 
cross-cut, its alleged communalist potentiality complicated by inter-religious 
conviviality, hospitality, and sharing.
In this way, a journalist acquaintance of mine found himself on that first day at die 
office of Ambon's Suara Maluku newspaper, alternately taking calls from a Muslim 
friend at home in the neighborhood where the battle subsequently broke out—the two 
of them were making plans for the party that evening—and a Christian friend with 
whom he was coordinating their joint attendance at the feast. On call from different 
ends of the city, his ongoing double conversation with the two friends and colleagues 
was itself an instance of the first stirrings of the conflict. After they had set their plans, 
the Muslim friend immediately called back, telling my friend to bring his camera since a 
fight had broken out—a regular fight, he said, the kind of thing we have seen before. 
Then the other friend called again, too, saying he would not come since people were in 
the streets with machetes, up in arms because of a burned-down church. Caught in 
between, my friend heard of both mosques and churches burned before any smoke was
14 See, however, "Indonesia: The Violence in Ambon," Human Rights Watch Report, March 2000, p. 6; and 
"Island of Ambon is Worst Trouble Spot in Indonesia," Radio Australia Indonesia Service, interview with 
Moluccas specialist Richard Chauvel, Ambonese journalist Rudi Fofid, and Sidney Jones, Asian Director of 
Human Rights Watch, broadcast on March 5,1999. My thanks to Rudi Fofid for a transcription of this 
broadcast.
15 Lori Blumenfeld, Revenge: A Story of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 54, with thanks to 
Michael Fischer for bringing this book to my attention.
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signaled in the city. As he himself put it, the rumor preceded the event and, contrary to 
laws of nature, where there was fire no smoke had been seen. Indeed, the only fire 
around was a surplus of misinformation and suspicion circulating like wildfire with 
incredible speed across Ambon.16
A strictly chronological account would fail to do justice to the erratic rhythms and 
unfoldings of the war which ride as much on fantasy and desire as on apprehension 
and fear. Rather than try to extricate a causal chain, I argue that confounding any clear 
trajectory from which one might plot the actions of the various parties involved is a 
swirl of images, vocabularies, sound-bites, slogans, and vectors introducing a host of 
mediatized and mediated elsewheres into the picture—or, inversely projecting Ambon, 
with all its troubles and sufferings, onto a larger than local scale. It is in the thick of 
such things and their powerful effects that one may begin to address Ambon's 
violence.17
Take the difference between the Christian "reds" and the Muslim "whites." If I 
have given the impression thus far that these stood each other off from that first day 
as ready-made enemies, that impression is misleading, for in fact this was hardly the 
case. Contrary to easy discussions of "dehumanization"—as if involving something 
that people wake up to one day and decide to do—the distancing that 
"dehumanization" presumes must actually be produced, with an enemy made and 
identities re-cognized and reforged in the heat of impending and ongoing confrontation. 
Once enmity is sealed in bloodshed and memory and codified through collective talk 
and imagery, dehumanization can apparently—horrifically and amazingly—become 
second nature for just about anyone—over time. For all the underlying tensions, inter­
religious rivalry, dark legacies of the Suharto era, and even turf wars between the 
military and police, the civil war in Ambon has been just that: civil, largely fought out 
among Ambonese, that is, among former colleagues, friends, and neighbors. A refugee 
from the area even suggested that the color-coordinated headties worn from the 
beginning on both sides were imperative to telling each other apart—a necessity given, 
he said, that we are all Ambonese.
Perhaps such colors could not sufficiently conjure difference out of taken-for- 
granted sameness or bear the weight of growing fear and hatred as the experience of
16 Any kind of balanced information was, not surprisingly, one of the first victims of the violence. Soon 
after the conflict broke out, the friends and Suara Maluku colleagues mentioned here could no longer come 
together, as their office was located in the now-Christian part of the city and their printing press across the 
border in Muslim territory. Seizing a good business opportunity when it emerged, the fawn Pos—the 
Surabaya-based owner of Suara Maluku—created a Muslim-spin-off, Ambon Expres, from the Suara 
Maluku, which under the circumstances increasingly defined itself as a Christian mouthpiece and community 
paper. For a general discussion of the press in Indonesia—including Jawa Pos's business strategy, see 
Kirshna Sen and David T. Hill, Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000). See Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, eds., The Media in Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of 
Ethnic Violence (London: Zed Books, 1999) on the role of especially the mass media in situations of war.
See also Philip Kitley's astute comments on media practice in conflicted situations in "Into the Thick of 
Things: Tracking the Vectors of 'Indonesian Mediations.' A Comment," in Indonesia in Search of Transition, 
ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt and Irwan Abdullah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2002), especially pp. 212- 
214.
17 With warm thanks to Philip Kitley for suggesting vectors as one way of tracking media effects in a 
confusing and changeable terrain and for advocating immersion in "the thick of things." See Kitley, "Into 
the Thick of Things . . . "
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war with its trail of anger, loss, and grief increasingly shaped the terms of perception 
and action on either side. Perhaps hatred is precisely such a restless search for new 
names and new labels in which provisionally to shelter an emotion that inevitably 
exceeds them. Whatever the case, additional names and images of the enemy-Other 
accreted along the way, further deepening the divide between Muslims and Christians 
and making it more difficult to imagine its undoing. A by-now infamous PSA (Public 
Service Announcement) broadcast on national TV and several commercial channels 
some months after the violence began seems to have been compelling enough to emerge 
as an emblem of mutual enmity. Shortly after its airing, the spot took on a life of its 
own, one quite different from that intended by its producer, who, as a result, now 
claims to suffer "trauma."
A sweet, sentimentalized vignette of only several minutes, "Voice of the Heart— 
Acang and Obet" features two young Ambonese boys, the Muslim "Acang," short for 
Hassan, and his bosom friend, the Christian Robert or "Obet."18 The scene takes place 
in an abandoned, gutted-out basement of a large concrete building evoking the ravages 
and dislocations of war. The spot opens with Acang awaiting his friend, anticipation 
on his face, and shows the smiles and joy of both boys when Obet arrives. The two 
share a quick, stolen conversation in which the more obvious problems afflicting 
Ambon's children somewhat stiffly parade by: Obet complains we can't go to school, 
see our friends, study at home, or sleep, Acang that he misses school since living in a 
refugee camp where life is difficult. To Acang's question "why did Ambon fall apart 
like this?," Obet responds, "I don't know, its a problem of adults." Acang is left with 
the punchline: "Its an adult problem and us kids are the victims." The camera zooms 
in on the two friends, who are posed with their arms around each other, speaking 
jointly from the heart, the one echoing the other, voicing the hope and mutual promise 
that "even if Ambon is destroyed like this, our bond of brotherhood should not be 
broken."
The spot has all the trappings of a documentary—sophisticated photorealist 
technique and a credible backdrop bolstering cinema's illusory realism,19 authentic 
Ambonese dialect, Indonesian subtitles, and two emblematic Ambonese young boys. 
The drama resurrects the trope of friends tom apart by uncontrollable circumstances— 
a dramatic situation seen on screen as early as D. W. Griffith's 1915 classic Birth of a 
Nation, set in America's Civil War, but also portrayed more recently, with the 
Indonesian Revolution as setting, in the film version of Hella Haasse's book, Oeroeg. 
Strikingly though, unlike their predecessors—whether standing in for North and South 
or the Netherlands and newborn Indonesia—"Voice of the Heart'"s Ambonese heroes 
do not grow up.
To be sure, children are the future of any nation and emphatically so in Indonesia 
where some 70 percent of the population is under the age of twenty. The war in 
Ambon has had terrible effects on everyone, not the least children, many of whom have
181 would like to thank Victor Joseph and Wim Manuhutu for helping me procure the Public Service 
Announcement. Produced by Franky Sahilatua.
19 On the workings of backdrops, see Robert J. Gordon, "Backdrops and Bushmen: An Expeditious 
Comment," in The Colonising Camera: Photographs in the Making of Namibian History, ed. Wolfram 
Hartmann, Jeremy Silvester, and Patricia Hayes (Ohio University Press, 1998), pp. 111-117.
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been left fatherless, orphaned, homeless, in refugee camps, and out of school.20 Many 
have seen and experienced horrific things and many, too, have participated in their 
making, serving as militia messengers on both sides, becoming skilled producers of 
crude, deadly weapons, torching houses and vandalizing neighborhoods after an 
attack. One source claims that between two thousand and four thousand children, 
aged seven to twelve—or the same as Acang and Obet—have taken part in raids on 
"enemy" villages or assisted in defending their own. On the Christian side, they are 
known as pasukan agas, "sandfly troops," among the Muslims pasukan linggis 21
What fantasy, in brief, structures "Acang and Obet?" Letters and poems of refugee 
children testify, indeed, to their longings for former playmates.22 In contrast to these 
other children, who have no space for a reunion, Acang and Obet are provided with a 
cave-like shelter that acts as a microcosm where, speaking from children's' hearts, the 
pair evoke the pela blood-brotherhood mythologized in Maluku and currently refigured 
in peace and reconciliation dialogue. Their space is also a haven of apolitical 
innocence, located less beyond the upheavals of dislocation, refugee status, interrupted 
schooling, and everyday trouble—which the spot clearly names—but, more 
significantly, beyond the politics, power structures, and political-economy permeating
20 See also George Aditjondro, "Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies," p. 101.
21 From the refugees I interviewed in Manado I only heard the term pasukan agas. Other scholars of Maluku 
whom I questioned about the meaning of pasukan linggis offered different explanations of the word linggis. 
Wim Manuhutu claims linggis is a kind of fruit. James T. Collins offered a more historical interpretation. 
According to him, in Indonesian linggis means "crowbar." During the Japanese era there was a song (said, 
incidentally, to have been written by an Ambonese) the chorus of which was as follows:
Itu Inggris, kita linggis
Amerika kita seterika
Translation: "The English we'll just crowbar [prise] out, the Americans we'll iron flat." The PKI 
(Indonesian Communist Party) used the same melody and kept the chorus. The song, in other words, still 
circulates, though I doubt most Muslim Moluccans would be aware of this genealogy. Collins further 
pointed out that both "team names"—pasukan agas and pasukan linggis—are entirely Indonesian, not being 
Ambonese Malay or emblematically Ambonese Malay. He also suggested how the different names index the 
different self-images of the opponents (and thus also, I would add, their intended or imagined effect on the 
enemy-other). Agas simply cause trouble and misery but do not totally displace the other camp. Linggis, on 
the other hand, implies the entire removal and dislocation of the opponent. I thank both Wim Manuhutu and 
especially Jim Collins for their help in unpacking these terms.
22 Many such poems and letters, as well as drawings, have been collected in publications put out by NGOs 
or other humanitarian-oriented groups. At least some of the children's work is produced in the context of 
post-violence trauma therapy and rehabilitation programs carried out by a few such organizations. See, for 
instance, Kisah di Balik Kehidupan: Anak Pengungsi Maluku Utara di Manado dalam Gambar dan Puisi 
(Manado: Yayasan Pelita Kasih Abadi/Catholic Relief Services Indonesia, 2001); "Program Therapi 
Emosional Pengungsi Anak di Manado (Jan-Maret 2001): Hasil Puisi," (Manado: Yayasan Pelita Kasih 
Abadi/Catholic Relief Services Jakarta), unpublished ms.; "Kumpulan Puisi Sanggar Kreatif Anak Bitung 
(Sept.-Des. 2000), Rakit Communication, unpublished ms.; Rumah Seng Ada Pintu: Anak-Anak Maluku
"Korban Kerusuhan"/Een Huis Zonder Deur: Molukse Kinderen: "Slachtoffers van Geweld" (Utrecht: 
Stichting TitanE, 2001); and on such projects, "Ambon children express trauma through art," The Jakarta 
Post, May 10, 2002. The last begins with a letter from "Sukardi," a refugee in Makassar, to his friend 
"Tammi Aimi" in Temate, N. Maluku, in which he expresses longing for his friend, but adds "I'm scared, 
wondering if you, my friend Tammi, are willing to welcome me back, as we saw our family among those who 
attacked yours." These trauma and post-violence programs are highly complicated projects resting on 
specific conceptions of childhood, memory, violence, and the future, and they deserve further, in-depth study. 
My thanks to Katinka van Heeren for bringing The Jakarta Post article to my attention.
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and informing all of these. The diminutive child's world also serves to diminish the 
conflict, bringing it down to size, shrinking it to an instance of spoken-from-the-heart 
childhood honesty and clairvoyance, and thereby trivializing its real impact on 
Ambonese children. Further, by blaming adults for Ambon's violence, the spot induces 
a double delegitimization—of the parents of all Obets and all Acangs and of pemuda 
or "youth," a morally charged category on the crest of all fundamental change in 
Indonesia thus far. What remains after this pernicious erasure is an abstract, easily 
appropriable clarity—a schematism amenable to all kinds of ends, including violence.
A name and face for the enemy is all that Ambonese took from the spot meant to 
foster peace among them. Interviews with refugees on my tapes from the last two years 
are replete with phrases like "Acang attacked," "Obet's territory," and so on, 
testifying to the currency of "Voice of the Heart"'s unforeseen after-life.23 If, arriving 
unwittingly from elsewhere, Acang and Obet's message went awry in its adjustment to 
Ambon's conditions so, inversely, do Ambonese actively borrow examples from other 
places held to approximate their own fraught world. Well before September 11, 
although I cannot date its emergence, the city's main dividing line between its Muslim 
and Christian parts has been known colloquially as die "Gaza Strip," Jalur Gaza. This 
name was already prepared in the first days of the conflict, when graffiti desecrating 
walls and buildings included insults of Jesus and the Prophet Muhammad, references 
to Jews, Israel, Muslim Power and Muslim Pigs, stars of David, and the phrase 
"Allahu Akbar" in Arabic writing.24 Such fragmentary, free-floating bits of discourse 
work best in display mode—on T-shirts, banners, posters, headties, as visual and 
verbal slogans. Coming out of context, they also transcend it, becoming both 
monumental and indexing a universe, one of closed ideological systems and stand-off 
positions.25 Over time, the mirrored vocabularies and practices of Ambon's two 
intimate enemies, emergent out of their ongoing negative exchange, further sedimented 
the city's own Gaza Strip.
My interest in this usurpation of a powerful name from elsewhere is double: in 
terms of its effects within the dynamics of the conflict, which are both more than local 
and less than global, though feeding off of and beholden to much larger than national 
designs; and in terms of the mediatized, mediated realities of Ambon, as virtualized as 
almost anywhere these days, especially since the war. Akin to the "synchronic 
novelties" identified by Benedict Anderson with the beginnings of the imagination of 
community as nation—like New York, New London, Nueva Leon, Nieuw Amsterdam—
23 This highlighting of children echoes other recent productions—one in which, notably, kids across the 
nation address letters to God, a symbol of order in a world where not only government and politics but, 
again, adults seem to fail them. The ninety-minute film, Viva Indonesia, produced by Garin Nugroho and the 
SET Foundation in 2001, features five short stories by four different directors. Visi Anak Bangsa and Anak 
Seribu Pulau: Kisah Anak-Anak Indonesia are also relevent. On the latter, see Karen Strassler's "Stories of 
Culture: Difference, Nation and Childhood, in "Children of a Thousand Islands, An Indonesian Television 
Series." The on-line reference is c http ://cc.joensuu.fi/sights/karens.htm>.
24 Rudi Fofid and Zairin Salempessy, Letter to AJI's (Aliansi Jumalis Independen) head office about 
"Journalists in the Disturbances of Ambon" (Wartawan dalam Huru-hara Ambon), February 10,1999, with 
thanks to Rudi Fofid.
25 My discussion here is indebted to Susan Stewart's on multum in parvo or "miniaturized language" in On 
Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984), especially pp. 52-53.
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Ambon's "Gaza Strip" could "arise historically only when substantial groups of 
people were in a position to think of themselves as living lives parallel to those of other 
substantial groups of people—if never meeting yet certainly proceeding along the same 
trajectory."26 Twinning these war-tom places may be one way of making the violence 
in Ambon—hardly a priority in Jakarta—matter, a way of lending local suffering and 
loss larger than local meaning.27 It also demonstrates the theatricality and dramatic 
imagining of social actors in a world dominated by NGOs, international peace-keeping 
initiatives, Human Rights Watchers, and other important audiences.28 One wonders, 
however, if the import of the conflict, once amplified, can thereafter so easily be scaled 
down29—adding an ironic twist to Marx's famous insight that men make their own 
history though not in conditions of their own making.
Such neat schema and ideologically compelling images, like those taken from 
"Voice of the Heart" and "Gaza Strip," are part of a much larger arena of conflicting 
messages, fragmentary information, representational immediacy, and stark clear-cut 
abstraction. They share the same space with phantom letters proven incendiary enough 
to trigger large-scale violence. One especially infamous incident involved a letter 
allegedly issued by Ambon's Protestant Church and calling for Maluku's 
Christianization, which, once multiplied, read aloud over megaphones, and spread 
about, led directly to the dislocation and deaths of numerous North Moluccans.30 Such 
"dark" circuits underlie, cross, and compete for attention with partisan descriptions 
disseminated by the local press (the aforementioned Suara Maluku newspaper, for 
instance, has spawned separate Muslim and Christian editions), with village gossip 
presented as truth on Christian and Muslim websites, and with Christian-inclined 
state radio vying with illegal Muslim radio stations (at one point the Laskar Jihad 
station dominated all the airwaves in Ambon, crowding out other channels, and even 
infiltrating the handie-talkies of priests). These divergent and convergent voices and 
views drown out, echo, interrupt, and jostle each other in the cramped, ideologized,
26 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso 1991 [1983]), pp. 187-88.
27 See James T. Siegel's excellent discussion of how "Indonesian violence often stimulates a recourse to 
recognition outside the framework of the initial conflict," which he links to the more general lack of 
sedimented identities or their formulation in a narrow, dialectical sense. See James T. Siegel, The Rope of 
God, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2000 [1969]), pp. 347-348.
28 More generally, the sense of audience is crucial to the production of political violence; as Ariel 
Heryanto, writing of the rapes of Chinese-Indonesian women in May of 1998, observes, "political rapes, 
like all political violence, are statement making. They involve some sort of authorship, medium, message, 
genre, style, and intended audience. The raped bodies are a sort of medium—comparable to walls 
vandalised with graffiti—on which the perpetrators inscribe messages directed towards an audience larger 
than those females directly assaulted. See Ariel Heryanto, "Race, Rape, and Reporting," in Reformasi: Crisis 
and Change in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (Clayton, Australia: 
Monash Asia Institute 1999), pp. 299-334.
29 Such amplification can, incidentally, be quite literal, as on a mural featured in one of many Muslim- 
produced VCDs (video CDs) showing Jesus holding a globe and the camera zooming in on Israel blown up 
to continental size, in Konflik Berdarah Maluku. The term "amplification" comes from Marshall Sahlins, 
who uses it to speak of similar processes in the context of the Peloponnesian Wars (personal 
communication).
36 For a facsimile and discussion of the letter, see Nanere, Halmahera Berdarah, pp. 63-80.
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divided space of Ambon, with all its mediated elsewheres, amplified, narrow-cast, 
obscure, and confusing realities.
Even the supposedly (on the face of it) simple problem of identifying actors—the 
who-dun-it of the violence—can be hard to pin down. Take the abstract lexicon 
produced by some non-partisan, pro-peace press journalists, people with the very best 
of intentions. With the aim of diminishing the conflict, these reporters often 
deliberately obfuscate the information of a violent exchange. Reading their accounts, 
one is left none the wiser; in these reports, the numbers of casualties and accounts of 
ruined property masquerade as precision alongside references to houses of worship 
stripped of denomination, and a string of elusive actors: "certain parties," unidentified 
"political elite," "puppeteers," and the ever-popular "provocateur."31 Whatever its 
aim, this lack of specificity to the agents of violence may in fact produce a sense of 
phantom danger, which lurks both nowhere in particular and therefore potentially 
everywhere in general, provoking fear and, perhaps even, new violence.32 Alongside, 
moreover, phrases like "Muslim cleansing," imported early on from Jakarta, and other 
vivid, slanted versions of war, a more neutral source is quickly marginalized since—as 
one Ambonese journalist put it—it appears ludicrous by contrast.
At first glance, the Video CDs or VCDs, produced by both Christian and Muslim 
partisans but circulated only by the latter (for this reason I focus on the Muslim VCDs) 
fly in the face of these other stark, stripped-down media reports. The VCDs' 
emotional appeal depends upon their sympathetic, almost tactile engagement with 
victims and their bodies: on close-ups of oozing wounds, bullets protruding from body 
parts, maimed and charred corpses, and the bodily contortions, moans, and screams 
of people's suffering too painful to watch. But they are watched, over and over again. 
Besides pictures of victims, these VCDs also show the occasional imam or Muslim 
NGO spokesperson, and the disembodied hands of surgical intervention (doctors 
themselves are rarely shown), so that the main action generally consists of mass scenes 
of attack and violence drawn from the war's earlier phases.33 Very much in "the thick 
of things," these VCDs provide little perspective on events and often make no 
pretension to having a narrative, besides, that is, the insistent, repetitive narrative of 
victimization resurrected on and out of body parts.
These VCDs are composite works; they range from the more professional to the 
homemade, though both "grades" of CDs often contain the very same clips, which are 
clearly shared and copied widely. Whereas in numerous shops throughout Indonesia it 
is possible to compile CDs of one's favorite songs, in Ambon it is possible to select 
favorite scenes of violence to be compiled on a personal VCD. Some of the clips are
31On the "newspeak" of reformasi in Indonesia with a special entry on "provokator," see Dirk Vlasblom's 
"Vademecum van de 'reformasi' in Indonesie. Megafoons en gefluister," NRC Handelsblad, March 4,2000, 
p. 33.
32 See my "Media and Violence in an Age of Transparency: Journalistic Writing on War-Torn Maluku," in 
Media, Religion, and the Public Sphere, ed. Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors (in progress).
33 If, as Henk Schulte Nordholt argues, violence has a history in Indonesia, so do its representations of 
violence (as is true elsewhere). One can speculate, for instance, that the cinematic preservation of mass as 
opposed to small-scale scenes of violence may lend credence to a communalist reading of the conflict. See 
Henk Schulte Nordholt's nuanced discussion in "A Genealogy of Violence in Indonesia," pamphlet (Lisbon: 
Centro Portugues de Estudos do Sudeste Asiatico [CEPESA], 2001).
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produced, or at least endorsed, by the military; these feature soldiers casually standing 
by or doing their thing, neither shying away from nor interrupting the camera. Others 
are said to have been filmed by doctor-volunteers who not only stitch wounds but lend 
their steady hands and surgical gazes to the close-up cinematic engagement of broken 
bodies. Many of these VCDs have clearly been pieced together, and many evidence the 
presence of different hands—some, indeed, steady, others shaky, and yet others 
apparently taken with the zoom function.
How does the mass appeal of the VCD genre translate into the actual creation of 
community and the shaping of perception and action in the conflict? This is a question 
with presumably somewhat different answers for Ambon's Muslim and Christian 
peoples, and one that I cannot pretend to really address here. If, however, community 
has anything to do with the circulation and consolidation of shared symbols, 
memories, and sentiments, then the nature of their mode of transfer and sedimentation 
is clearly important. Among Christians in Ambon, VCD traffic is relatively small-scale, 
difficult to break into, and closely controlled, with CDs bearing advisory labels like 
"intended for own group" (untuk kalangan sendiri). The Muslim VCDs, by contrast, are 
not only mass-produced, sold in the markets and streets of much of Indonesia, but 
transnationally popular and quite homogeneous: Ambon's VCDs look much like 
Kashmir's, Bosnia's, and video representations of Palestine shown in Malaysia and 
elsewhere.34
For any of these VCDs to have any effect—whether in the claustrophobic enclave 
of Ambon's Christian community or the transnational Muslim space stretched thinly, 
perhaps, across the geopolitical mosaic of different Islams—at least two things are 
needed, which I can only name here. The first are codified discourses like those of the 
Laskar Jihad or Christian FKM, mentioned earlier, which serve as rallying cries or even 
captions that orient and provide a framework for perception and action. Second, as 
Arjun Appadurai and Deborah Poole have suggested for other settings, there must be 
what Raymond Williams calls "social expressions in solution, as distinct from other 
semantic formations that have been precipitated and are evidently and more 
immediately available."35 Neither institutionalized or reflexively present, such "social 
expressions in solution"—or "modes of affect and feeling attendant on emergent social 
processes"—inhabit a patchy, dispersed terrain, constituting community only as a 
potential. Along with other factors and media, the highly mobile VCDs are themselves, 
of course, part and parcel of the making of this terrain.
One of the most professional VCDs in my possession, titled "North Maluku's 
Suffering" (Maluku Utara Berduka), graphically intimates the kind of fluid, contingent 
"expressions in solution" which must have prefigured the Muslim community
34 With thanks to Farish Noor.
35 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 132-134. See 
also Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large, on what he calls "communities of sentiment" and on mass- 
mediated sodalities of worship and charisma, pp. 8-9, and p. 153 on "structures of feeling" in ethnic 
violence; see also Deborah Poole's excellent discussion of the formation of transnational bourgeois 
sensibilities through the circulation of late nineteenth-century cartes de visite in Poole, Vision, Race, and 
Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Image World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1997), pp. 
107-141, especially 112-113.
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congealed on screen.36 On screen, the gathering, including several women and children, 
is bent to the common task of Jihad in North Maluku but, I believe, in another situation, 
this crowd would have been just as easily dispersed. Visibly at least, the community is 
an ad hoc collection of eclectic affinities: everyone is dressed more or less in white, but 
some appear orthodox and sober, while others are inscribed from head to waist with 
azimat (magical charms dating to the Crusades), others are in Saudi-style dress, others 
wrapped in Palestinian headscarves, still others Jihad-Yogya style. Several carry 
Southern Philippine Moro-shaped machetes, others bows and arrows or spears, some 
AK-47s, while a few even wield plastic guns, perhaps for their effect on unsupposing 
audiences.
Throughout this paper I have stressed the role of the possible and the conditional— 
of which social expressions in solution form a part—or what might be called 
anticipatory practice in the context of extraordinary, violent circumstances. It remains 
very briefly to be suggested what people caught in the midst do—with multiple 
influences and images impinging upon them. Once again, the general climate of fear, 
insecurity, and mental and physical exhaustion which Ambonese inhabit everyday is 
important to bear in mind. These are the conditions for what I call a hyper­
hermeneutics,37 which could be defined as a compulsive need to interpret and mine just 
about everything for hidden meaning, to see any trivial occurrence as a sign or omen of 
what might come. There is, relatedly, the drive to produce signs, signs for one's own 
community, for other social actors, for larger relevant audiences, and, not the least, for 
the enemy-other; headties, graffiti, and the like are signs. Lest this seem too cerebral, 
the crucial dimension filling out this constellation of anticipatory practice is extreme, 
pervasive distrust: things are so thoroughly scrutinized because their nature and 
appearance are suspected of concealing something else.38
The prevalent assumption that things are other than they seem is nowhere more 
evident than in the discourse of disguise and revelation following an attack and 
running through the more general talk around the conflict. A discourse of hidden depth, 
such talk revolves around the discoveries made when corpses are undressed, when the 
folds and pockets of garments are explored and turned inside-out, disclosing a truer 
identity underneath; thus, a jihad fighter might reportedly be found with an army 
uniform under his robe, or dates in a pocket are seen as indexing a devious connection 
to the Middle East, or, again, folded papers with talismans are held to reveal the 
presence of hidden designs, and so on.39 More disturbingly even, just under the surface
36 The VCD is produced by the Dompet Sosial Ummul Quro based in Bandung. The organization's address, 
phone and fax numbers, and bank account information are all listed on the VCD jacket. It has a copyright 
from 2000.
371 would like to thank Webb Keane for providing me with this term.
38 This kind of suspicion is common among intimate enemies, such as those involved in Ambon's civil war. 
Appadurai links the extreme violence often characteristic of such conflict to the sense of betrayal between 
appearance and reality as "a perceived violation of the sense of knowing who the Other was and of rage 
about who they really turn out to be." Appadurai, Modernity at Large, pp. 154-55.
39 For another example of the intimate coupling of pockets and identity, see Patricia Spyer, "What's in a 
pocket? Religion and the Formation of a Pagan Elsewhere in Aru, Eastern Indonesia," in De bindkracht der 
dingen, Tijdschrift voor Empirische Filosofie, ed. Hans Harbers and Sjaak Koenis, 1, XXIII (1999): 37-49; see 
also Patricia Spyer, The Memory of Trade: Modernity's Entanglements on an Eastern Indonesian Island 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 92-100.
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of your regular Ambonese face, more and more people claim to discern its "Christian" 
or "Muslim" contours. This attempt to see through everything can only emerge in a 
situation where people in fact see nothing at all. This predicament—of being trapped 
in events beyond one's grasp and comprehension, of seeing no way out, of immersion 
in the thick context of terrible things—comes through poignantly on my taped 
conversations with Moluccan refugees and in the voices and demeanor of Ambonese 
men and women speaking on news reports made before last February's Malino Peace 
Agreement.
Exceptional circumstances like those of Ambon's civil war expose the norm, 
underscoring how much context is always a sedimentation of the imaginary and the 
product of imagination's work. In this paper I have implicitly challenged the taken-for- 
granted, if hopelessly impoverished, anthropological notion of the "ethnographic 
context"—in dire need of refurbishing for our radically changing twenty-first century 
world. Inevitably, I have glossed over complexities, highlighting certain dynamics at the 
expense of others equally important. I have written of media effects, agency, the work 
of imagination, and violence—elsewhere—always a tricky business. In the best of 
anthropological traditions, the study of "elsewhere" was from the beginning meant to 
promote reflection at home, to produce critical thinking on one's own society. Today 
we are all too aware that such elsewheres—once romanticized anthropological 
havens—increasingly impinge upon us, that their troubles and violence are our troubles 
and violence, too.
